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Abstract: This study seeks to examine why former Soviet states, united by common political and 
economic history through their time under the Soviet Union, have taken such radically different 
paths in development. Chiefly, why are some states in the region some of the most 
democratically developed in the world, but others are some of the least? Natural resource rents 
are introduced as a factor that can stall development by limiting the capacity for critical 
democratic institutions to develop.  Utilizing a fixed-effects regression analysis, we find that 
higher resource rents as a percent of GDP have a statically significant, negative relationship with 
democratic development.   
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The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 is often viewed as the end of an era, but for the 
fifteen Soviet Republics it was just the beginning of a complex and complicated process of 
societal reform and reconstruction.  The process of creating an independent, democratic nation is 
typically long and arduous, lasting many years. It requires popular participation, civil society, 
political parties, and many other important institutions, none of which form overnight.  On top of 
creating their own economies to replace the collapsing, centrally-planned economy of the Soviet 
Union, the newly independent states had to learn how to create vital institutions that allow them 
to govern themselves.  
A cursory glance at the relative democratic development of the former Soviet republics 
demonstrates the large discrepancy in freedoms that their citizens enjoy and levels of 
authoritarianism within government, even today. Each state faced, or still faces, a unique set of 
barriers to democratic development and consolidation.  Why is it that countries that are in a 
similar geographic area with a similar political and economic background during their time under 
Soviet rule have such a drastic disparity in development?  
 When surveying at the literature on countries struggling with the resource curse, a pattern 
of uneven development begins to emerge.  Many of the former Soviet Countries that are 
naturally rich in oil, natural gas, and hard rock minerals also happen to have the least developed 
democracies.  Countries with little to no natural resource exports in the same regions, however, 
are some of the most democratically developed and consolidated in the world.  Considering this 
discrepancy, two hypotheses were formed to explain the uneven development of former Soviet 
states: (H1) As institutionalization increases, level of democracy is likely to increase; (H2) On 
average, as the availability of natural resources decreases, democracy is likely to increase. 
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Resource Curse Theory and Rentier States 
 The concept of the resource curse stems from a 1995 paper written by Sachs and Warner, 
which was the first to argue that “economies with a high ratio of natural resource exports to 
GDP… tended to have low growth rates in the subsequent period” (Sachs and Warner 1995, 2).  
Generally, the body of resource curse literature has found a “significant negative correlation 
between natural resource abundance and economic growth” (Kronenberg 2004, 400). The 
research that followed the groundbreaking Sachs and Warner study has sought to find the reason 
why the resource curse effect occurs. Kronenberg summarizes the hunt for the missing feature 
with his statement, “if natural resources crowd out some activity X, and X is important for 
growth, then natural resources slow down growth” (Kronenberg 2004, 401).  
 To properly understand the resource curse theory it is critical to first have an 
understanding of Rentier states. Rentier state theory investigates the reasons why government 
elites in natural resource rich countries choose polices that inhibit growth (Di John 170). In 
resource rich countries, revenue tends to originate in the central government or with elites, so 
there is a greater opportunity to exploit the resources due to greater discretion. Natural resources 
are also produced in a markets that are not extremely competitive, making it easier to corner the 
market (Kronenberg 2004, 402).   
Di John defines rents as “excess incomes or the proportion of earnings in excess of the 
minimum amount needed to attract a worker to accept a particular job or a firm to enter a 
particular industry” (Di John 2011, 171).  The excess incomes can result from a wide range of 
sources, including higher rates due to monopolies, income from scarce resources, political 
transfers (subsidies), or outright corruption (Di John 2011, 171; Kronenberg 2004, 403).  The 
extra income generates an interest in elites to maintain theses rents, which is called rent seeking.  
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Elites “seek to create, maintain, or change the rights and institutions on which the rents are 
based” (Di John 2011, 171). In practice, this often results in corruption.  The concept of rent 
seeking was summarized by the Iron Law of Rent-Seeking, which states, “wherever a rent is to 
be found, a rent seeker will be there trying to get it” (Di John 2011, 172).  
Oil and mineral abundance results in excessive rent seeking, which, in turn, results in 
corruption and low growth (Di John 2011, 171). The corrupt transactions necessary to maintain 
these rents reduces the security of property rights, which lowers investment in long-term projects 
that would typically facilitate growth. Additionally, the revenue from rents make the government 
less reliant on the tax base, which decreases the influence of the citizens that would be otherwise 
exercised. The government is then free to make large expenditures without popular consent 
(Franke et al. 2009, 112). When rentier states do invest in the country it is often in safe 
investments, such as large building projects, or transferred overseas, neither of which will bolster 
domestic growth (Di John 2011, 172).   
The Search for Factor “X” 
At the heart of resource curse theory is the theory that there is “a significant negative 
correlation between natural resource abundance and economic growth” (Kronenberg 400).  The 
previous conclusion underscores the arguments nearly all the literature in support of the resource 
curse, many of which seek to find feature “X.” The theories underpinning the overall effect vary, 
but corruption, uneven development, and variations of the two are common features of the 
theories.  
Kronenberg believes that corruption and neglect of basic education play the role of X; he 
argues that the natural resource sector requires a limited number of ruling elites and large 
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numbers of low-skill workers, which de-incentivizes education in resource abundant countries. 
Kronenberg argues that the resource curse can be avoided by resource-rich countries by fighting 
corruption. Kronenberg also argues that the resource curse is due to a crowding out of certain 
sectors in his article “The Curse of Natural Resources in the Transition Economies,” but instead 
states that corruption and education are the major factors being crowded out. 
To some degree, the Kronenberg study follows the general pattern of the Sachs and 
Warner study, which posits that “there must be some sort of crowding out: if natural resources 
crowd out some activity X, and X is important for growth, then natural resources slow down 
growth” (Kronenberg 2004, 401).  The study utilizes a stepwise regression to exclude irrelevant 
variables.  Kronenberg is eventually left with four relevant variables that account for over 80% 
of the variation exhibited (Kronenberg 2004, 411). The study addresses four prominent theories 
for the resource curse: rent seeking and corruption, Dutch Disease, neglecting investment in 
human capital, and non-sustainable resource extraction.  The study concludes that the resource 
curse does exist because transition countries “relatively abundant in natural resources performed 
very poorly in terms of economic growth,” (Kronenberg 2004, 421).  After conducting regression 
analyses studying the effect of each variable on economic growth, Kronenberg rejects the 
theories of Dutch Disease and non-sustainable resource use.  He accepts both corruption and lack 
of human capital investment as statistically significant factors influencing the economic growth 
of transition economies.  Kronenberg argues that the corruption of the natural resource sector 
occurs because it is inherently elitist and monopolistic due to the capital investment required 
(Kronenberg 2004, 403).  Business is also conducted in rural areas estranged from rule of law. 
Estrangement from major populations and elitist rule encourages bribery and corruption, which 
decreases the incentive to invest and hinders economic development (Kronenberg 2004, 403).  
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Kronenberg theorizes that there are very few well-rewarded, high-skill careers in the oil and gas 
industry, which tend to be reserved for elites.  As a result, low skill workers are the predominate 
need.  Governments seeking immediate revenue have an incentive to devalue investment in 
human capital through education (Kronenberg 2004, 404).   
One issue with the Kronenberg study is that it cannot account for the size of the effect of 
the natural resource curse due to the impact of multicollinearity; there is a pre-existing “close 
correlation of natural resource abundance and corruption” (Kronenberg 2004, 423). This study 
hopes to resolve that that issue by breaking down the effects of the resource curse on a number  
Kronenberg’s dismissal is disputed by Horáth and Zeynalov’s theory that the natural 
resource curse crowds out manufacturing sectors unless high-quality institutions are already in 
place to counter the curse.  All three authors, however, agree that previous institutions are a 
significant factor in the success of a country overcoming the resource curse (Horváth and 
Zeynalov 2014, 4).  Horáth and Zeynalov utilize a panel regression analysis to discover that there 
is a “negative relationship between natural resources and growth only for countries with bad 
institutional frameworks” (Horváth and Zeynalov 2014, 6).  They utilize multiple measures of 
institutional quality, all of which led to the same conclusion (Horváth and Zeynalov 2014, 16).  
Many features of the regime were included in the measure of institutional quality: corruption 
control, rule of law, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, political stability/ absence of 
violence, and accountability (Horváth and Zeynalov 2014, 7).  The study controlled for 
intervening variables, including location.  Kronenberg utilized distance from Moscow, Paris, and 
the ocean, but this study utilized a much simpler measure- degrees longitude from Brussels.  An 
abundance of natural resources can crowd out the manufacturing sector, which tends to produce 
significant economic growth.  Well-structured institutions can be put in place to counter the 
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effects of the resource curse, but the analysis also finds that more time spent under a communist 
regime increases the chance that they will damage the integrity of the institutions within a 
country (Horváth and Zeynalov 2014, 17).   
One prominent issue with the Kronenberg study is the repeated omission of outliers in 
order to increase the statistical significance of certain key features to the theory. One example is 
Moldova, which was excluded from some regression analyses due to its economic success in 
agricultural export growth, as opposed to oil exports (Kronenberg 2004, 413).    
In the journal article “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse,” Michael L. Ross 
argues that, while there is great merit to previous economic theories behind the resource curse, 
the ambiguities of the theory can likely be explained by cognitive, societal, and state-centered 
political explanations (Ross 1999).  He argues that, while there is strong evidence the resource 
curse is true, an increase in cooperation between economic and political science research, more 
strict definitions of variables, and further empirical study on these issues will reveal why it 
occurs. 
Ross draws upon multiple cross-sectional and case study analyses to develop his 
arguments.  Using a meta-analysis, Ross compares the merits of four economic resource curse 
theories to three political science theories before advancing two new theories he believes deserve 
further scholarship.  The economic theories discussed include a decline in the terms of trade for 
primary commodities, instability of international commodity markets, poor linkages between 
resource and non-resource sectors, and “Dutch Disease” (Ross 1999, 298). Nearly all these 
problems can be remedied or even prevented by government officials, yet, they are seen in many 
resource-rich, developing countries.  Ross believes that the economic studies are missing one 
feature- political reality (Ross 1999).  Ross introduces three reasons why governments manage 
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their resources poorly and make shoddy attempts at resolution.  Cognitive explanations argue 
“that resource booms create short-sightedness among policymakers”, societal explanations offer 
that “resource exports tend to empower sectors, classes, or interest groups that favor growth-
impeding policies,” and state-centered explanations “contend that resource booms weaken state 
institutions” (Ross 1999, 298).  Though these avenues are promising, they are not without flaws. 
For instance, the cognitive theory operates against the general assumption that actors are rational 
people and there is little evidence that economic windfalls create growth-impeding institutions 
(Ross 1999, 308-310). Last, he introduces state ownership of natural resources and failure to 
enforce property rights (Ross 1999, 319-20).  These statements are introduced as starting points 
for collaboration between political science and economics.   
Franke et al. provides a case study analysis of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to exemplify 
the effect of natural resource abundance on countries in the Caspian region as rentier states 
(Franke, Gawrich, and Alakbarov 2009, 111-112). Like many other studies, the authors cite 
corruption and rent-seeking elites as the reason for the resource curse. The findings of this study 
are expanded upon later, as the characterization of the post-Soviet rentier state developed in the 
text is utilized as tool to understand the effect that occurs at the intersection between a former 
Soviet state and a resource rich state.  
Huntington proposes that the most successful democratic transitions occur when there is a 
moderate or high amount of wealth present due to the non-state power vested in critical private 
entities (Huntington 1991, 64-65). The previously described effect is not present in counties with 
large quantities of oil wealth because the money accrued remains within the bureaucracy, where 
it enriches the state and elites without enriching other sectors, also known as a rentier state 
(Huntington 1991, 65).  
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Much of the dissenting literature hinge their arguments on the statistical methods used, 
not the theories.  Alexeev and Conrad disagreed with resource curse theory and instead asserted 
that mineral and oil wealth has either no impact or a minor positive impact on growth and 
development.  They argue that utilizing quality of institutions as a control variable has skewed 
the results of previous authors’ studies to appear more negative. They do, however, concede that 
“large natural resource endowments appear to increase per capita GDP without a simultaneous 
improvement of the country’s institutions” (Alexeev and Conrad 2004, 595). Oil-based wealth 
still results in slower growth when compared to manufacturing-based countries, even if the 
growth is positive. In a way, Alexeev and Conrad’s article supports the hypothesis that 
institutionalization does have an impact on the way countries experience the resource curse and 
how institutions can best be utilized to prevent it from occurring.  
Patrimonialism in Former Soviet States 
 Many of the problems that are present in modern post-Soviet states, especially in civil 
and political society, are the effects of the patrimonial system seen in the Soviet Union. The 
modern effects of this political structure is called “neopatrimonialism” (Franke et al. 112).  The 
Placing former high-ranking members of the former Communist party into the newly free states 
allowed the tight-knit structure of elites to infiltrate the brand-new states, instilling these norms 
from the start.  Patrimonialism means that the government works through “personal networks” of 
elites (Franke et al. 112).  The services and resources given to the patrons are not for the good of 
the whole of society and typically serve only elites.  There are two webs of patronage in former 
Soviet states- the old and the new (Franke et al. 113).  Both webs are still active in former Soviet 
rentier states.  The old system is the remnants of the strict Communist party hierarchy.  The new 
9 
 
 
system is comprised predominately of the family of elites, as well as business executives, 
especially those in oil (Franke et al. 113).  
Former Soviet States as Rentier States 
 The effects of the resource curse are seen in a limited number of former Soviet Rentier 
States, generally acknowledged to include Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan, though a few other states may experience similar effects to a lesser degree.  There 
are several features that are universal across Post-Soviet Rentier States identified by Franke et al. 
that explain the hurdles these states face in order to democratize and consolidate The features are 
a synthesis of studies of state documents, media reports, NGO reports, interviews, and national 
roundtables.   
Characteristics of Post-Soviet Rentier States (Franke et al. 2009) 
(1) Elite power in oil and gas contact conclusions  
(2) Permanent, corrupt and rent-seeking elites 
(3) Support purchased through rent allocation  
(4) Lack of regulation of economic structures 
(5) Missing concepts in relation to distribution 
(6) Lack of transparency 
(7) Medium legitimacy in relation to resource policy 
The damaging effects of one-party rule, suppression of civil and political society, little to no 
government accountability, and a centrally planned economy under Soviet Rule can be witnessed 
in former Soviet Rentier states. Their institutions have been so badly damaged that they now 
have to make a concerted effort to rebuild each of their institutions in order to create a 
successful, accountable, representative government. Franke, Gawrich, and Alakbarov line out the 
above seven-feature characterization of Post-Soviet Rentier States that will be used to explain the 
effects of natural resource abundance on institutions. It will also serve as a framework for the 
later case studies of Kazakhstan and Ukraine to illustrate the effects of Soviet Occupation and 
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Natural Resource Abundance on the development of institutions that lead to an effective, lasting 
democratic government. 
The first characteristic, elite power in oil and gas contracts, is a prerequisite to the other 
characteristics due to its centrality to rent-seeking behavior.  This incentive leads to the second 
characteristic- permanent, corrupt, and rent-seeking elites. In post-Soviet rentier states, decisions 
about the oil and gas industries are made entirely by elites. In the context of many post-Soviet 
rentier states, elite rule means that the patrimonial presidents the decisions and other government 
entities are far too weak to contest executive power, allowing elite discretion to carry on 
indefinitely (Franke et al. 124).  The terms in oil and gas contracts have had economic outcomes 
that have prevented the development and stability of certain institutions, which have allowed the 
continuity of elite power.   
The elites creating gas and oil contracts have a great incentive to act in a selfish and 
individualistic manner (Franke et al. 125). They make the terms, so it is in their interest to make 
them in their favor. In states where natural resources constitute most of the national income, 
there is a decreased need to rely on the tax base.  The lack of accountability to the tax base 
further alienates elites from the general public, ensuring that elites feel removed form the 
“everyday people” in the country. Removal from the everyday experiences makes it much easier 
for elites to eschew welfare projects and purse projects that benefit themselves only.  Often, the 
selfish behavior can become illegal behavior, which instills corrupt practices into the structure of 
government. There has been a number of financial scandals that have taken place in post-Soviet 
rentier states in which elites enriched themselves with oil contracts and stored the spoils in 
foreign banks (Franke et al. 126). A few bold journalists condemned the actions, but no real 
consequences have come from corrupt behaviors (Franke et al. 126).  
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The clientelist, clan-like structure of the post-Soviet political society also ensures that control 
over gas and oil remains within tight hierarchy of government elites (Franke et al. 125).   Control 
of such critical and profitable industries are only trusted to family members or the inner circle. 
Lack of rule of law and a defunct judiciary allow patronage systems to form without impunity 
(Franke et al. 126).  Lack of punishment has ensured corrupt, rent seeking elites that their acts 
will not be punished, which has ensured them that they are free to continue and expand their 
illegal and immoral acts.   
The third feature that is discussed is support purchased by rent allocation (Franke et al. 127). 
At first, this characteristic appears contradictory, as a hallmark of rentier states is lack of 
investment. To legitimize the corrupt, ineffective hyper-presidential system, governments will 
often use some of the oil rents to purchase the support of the constituency though free healthcare, 
education, or other initiatives (Franke et al. 127). This lends the government the necessary 
amount of legitimacy for many citizens to look the other way when scandals arise. Governments 
can purchase the support of their constituency without making long-term investments that would 
result in growth. These programs are often created and executed by the executive. Weak 
legislative bodies and patrimonial systems ensure that these programs continue over the years. 
The fourth feature is the lack of regulation of economic structures (Franke et al. 128).  As 
previously stated, former Soviet states suffered from a simultaneity problem, which means that 
they underwent massive changed in both political and economic society.  Many states had to 
create their own economies form the ground up, placing them behind other “modern” economies 
who had longer to develop (Franke et. al 128).  Often, the failure to modernize takes the form of 
investment in manufacturing and human capitol, both of which have a positive effect on long-
term economic growth and prosperity (Kronenberg 403-405). Instead of utilizing domestic 
12 
 
 
industries to support oil and gas exports, many of the post-Soviet rentier states contracted those 
industries to foreign economies.  Many of the machines and parts necessary for oil production 
were made abroad when they could have been a prominent domestic industry to bolster domestic 
manufacturing, continuing the cycle of uneven development.  Trade protectionism was also used 
to counter uneven development, but ultimately ended in poorer quality products made an a less 
efficient manner (Franke et al. 129).  There has been a lot of programs and plans to counteract 
the uneven development of industries created by local think tanks and NGO’s, but none have 
been implemented (Franke et al. 129).   
The tendency for post-Soviet rentier states to engage in “white elephant projects” is also due 
to inattention to economic structures.  A white elephant is a metaphor for “large infrastructural 
investment (often in the form of a partial gift from central authority) whose cost of maintenance 
is not line with its value. It is often approved for political or symbolic reasons and it cannot be 
sold in normal circumstances (Beebel, Markus and Ploom 2019, 18). White elephant projects in 
former Soviet states are typically a symbolic gesture used to reflect an image of power and 
prosperity that quickly become a massive drain on the economy.  
One does not have to look further than Ashgabat, Turkmenistan for a prime example of white 
elephant projects.  A uniform characteristic across all of the post-Soviet rentier states is that they 
have elaborate capitals built for populations much larger and wealthier than those who occupy it.  
The city is clad in glistening white marble. Travelers have noted, however, that these brilliant 
cities look like ghost towns (Taylor 2013).  For instance, expensive shops and cafes line the 
streets of the capitol city, but are seldom used by the locals, many of which can not afford it.  To 
build the city itself, funding of education and a third of all pensions were cut (Taylor 2013). 
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Clearly, this is a symbolic gesture of strength to the outside world, not an attempt to facilitate 
growth.  
Only 120 miles from Ashgabat is the village of Derweze. This small village was essentially 
wiped off the map in 2004, only three weeks after its inhabitants were evicted (Taylor 2013). The 
destruction of the village occurred because President Niyazov mentioned the ugly appearance of 
the village in relation to the sheer beauty of the curated city or Ashgabat (Taylor 2013).  The 
inequality demonstrated by the cities and the outlying areas demonstrates how these projects are 
not designed to fit the needs of the locals or improve the economic standing of the country. 
These projects are undertaken to create a façade of success and lavishness to conceal the true 
inequality and authoritarian rule present within the country.  They are often closely crafted by the 
President of the country, which highlights the rentier state mentality that oil profits are at the 
discretion of the elites, not the people or the country.   
The fifth feature is missing aspects in relation to distribution. There is no consistent 
redistribution of income or social support to assist the citizens when gas prices rapidly shift. In 
fact, post-Soviet rentier states tend to have abnormally high poverty rates for the level of income 
they bring in (Franke et al. 129). Any distribution that occurs happens in order to “consolidate 
power structures by balancing social and economic disequilibrium, rather than for political 
liberalization” (Franke et al. 130).  Support is often given through non-transparent channels set in 
place by the patrimonial legacy of the Soviet Union. Any welfare given is for the express 
purpose of buying support, as opposed to creating an equal, stable economy.   
 The sixth feature is lack of transparency. Already discussed was the incentive for elites to 
lie and be corrupt, so it is logical that government structures would be designed to be opaque to 
hide the corrupt activities from the general public so that elites can continue to profit from oil 
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and gas exports (Franke et a. 129).  Post-Soviet rentier states lack the necessary civil and 
political society to act as a “Watchdog” and hold the government accountable (Franke et al. 131).   
 The final characteristic is medium legitimacy in relation to resource policy.  Due to the 
influence of Soviet patrimonialism, many citizens still fear criticizing the government.  There is 
also “massive loyalty” to the elite inner circle (Franke et al. 132).  The phrase “medium 
legitimacy” fits best because rentier states will create programs to keep the people complacent, 
but never fully invest to improve the conditions themselves.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
Figure 1: Oil Rent Over Time 
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 Observing the polity score of a country over time can grant a lot of insight into their 
unique path toward democratization. Many of the resource-poor countries exhibit a very similar 
pattern of democratization.  The steep drop-off occurs in the early 1900’s.  In the wake of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, there was unrest that occurred as countries gained their 
independence and set out to find a way to best govern themselves.  As institutions began to 
develop and consolidate, the level of democratization begins a steady climb until it reaches a 
high level and plateaus.   
 Similarly, common trends can be observed across resource rich states, though the patterns 
are not as uniform as resource poor countries.  Except for Turkmenistan, there is a steep, short 
jump in score before it falls rapidly and plateaus at a very low level of democratization.  Though 
specific explanations for this erratic time may be offered by each country, there is a general 
pattern experienced by countries who were highly dependent on the centrally planned economy. 
The end of the Soviet Union was the end of the subsidized industries in many of the now oil 
producing countries, so the period of chaos was especially intense. The relief and stability 
offered by new, emerging ndustries have a limited effect on level of democracy as elites 
consolidate power and exert more influence over time.   
Democratization and Consolidation  
If natural resource abundance damages the democratic development of states, just how 
does one quantify the process of democratization and determine which states are democratic? 
Just because a country is no longer authoritarian does not mean that it is democratic (Huntington 
1991, 33).  The process of becoming a true liberal democracy is a long road that follows a set of 
stages. Each country’s pathway to democracy is different, but general trends can be observed in 
the democratization processes of countries.   
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One process that is related to democratization is liberalization.  Liberalization is a mix of 
“policy and social changes” that expand the rights and liberties of individuals, such as freedom 
of the press and legal safeguards (Linz and Stepan 1996, 3). Liberalization can occur without 
democratization, which is the next step towards consolidated democracy, but is just a sign of 
larger reforms and should not be confused with democratization.  
The process of democratization requires “open contestation over the right to win control 
of the government, and this in turn requires free competitive elections, the results of which 
determine who governs” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 3). Democratization is the introduction of 
democratic structures into a society.  This definition does not fully address the electoralist 
fallacy, which assumes that countries with elections are inherently democratic (Linz and Stepan 
1996, 4).  Authoritarian regimes in the modern era can utilize elections to create a façade of 
democracy while maintaining corrupt practices behind closed doors.  Realistically, democratic 
representation requires a complex system of uniform practices and social norms that go far 
beyond regular elections.  The way that this pitfall is avoided is through the last stage of 
democratic development, consolidation.  The features of a consolidated democracy are best 
explained by this succinct quote from Linz and Stepan: 
“[Democratic Transition is] complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about 
the political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to 
power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto 
has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and 
judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share the power with 
other parties de jure” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 4).   
In consolidated democracies, respect for created institutions is mutual and unconditional 
between the people and the government.  There is an expectation that all problems will be solved 
within this set framework.  Consolidation occurs when the prevailing sentiment within the 
18 
 
 
country is the expectation of peaceful transition of power through established avenues of 
democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996, 6).   
There are three dimensions in which democracies can consolidate: Behaviorally, 
Attitudinally, and Constitutionally. Countries that are behaviorally consolidated do not have 
outside actors spending “significant resources” creating a nondemocratic regime to turn to 
violence, foreign intervention, or succession.  Attitudinally, a “strong majority” of citizens 
believe that democratic procedures are the best way to address problems that arise. Support for 
interventions outside the system are not a part of the mainstream public opinion.  
Constitutionally, both government and nongovernment forces are subject to conflict resolution 
though “laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process” (Linz and 
Stepan 1996).  
The Role of Institutions  
 Institutions can be a mitigating factor in the effect of the resource curse. By 
implementing democratic norms within the civil and political society of a state, the damaging 
effects of the resource curse can be neutralized. Institutions are the framework upon which 
democracies are built. Democratic governments inherently grant more privileges to the people, as 
opposed to monopolization by the government, but this does not mean that these aspects are not 
without order. For democracies to operate efficiently, there must be an existing framework to 
support a free society.  Linz and Stepan identify five arenas, or factors, of consolidated 
democracies. These arenas are required institutions for the proper democratization and 
consolidation of a developing country because they are necessary to create a truly free society. It 
is crucial that these institutions are created and maintained by the people, not the government, in 
order to properly utilize government oversight capabilities.  The five arenas are: a free and lively 
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civil society; a “relatively autonomous and valued political society;” rule of law; state 
bureaucracy; and “institutionalized economic society” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 7). Each of these 
five factors contribute to the development and consolidation of a nation. Additionally, each 
factor has been inhibited by Soviet occupation in in former Soviet Republics, thought the extent 
varies widely.  
 The first is a free and lively civil society.  One of the first signs of a developing 
democracy, civil society is the complex web of communally supported groups that facilitate 
interactions between citizens with common interests. There is a wide range of civil society 
groups; religious groups, labor unions, professional organizations, and social clubs are just one 
of many examples of civil society groups. For civil society to thrive, it needs to have a “sphere of 
autonomy from the state,” which means that civil groups are guaranteed from excessive intrusion 
or influence on behalf of the government (Bernhard 1993, 307). Autonomy from the state often 
means that the freedom to assemble and the freedom to speak freely is recognized and respected 
by the government.  
 Civil society acts as an intermediary between the state and the community and a 
communicator of mutuall interests. The role of intermediary means that civil society can exert 
influence over politics and “radically alter” them (Bernhard 1993, 308).  Civil society is crucial 
to the development of democracy because it is the framework in which citizen interests are 
consolidated and communicated to the government on behalf of the citizens. Civil society also 
promotes the idea of social consent of the governed (Bernhard 1993, 314). As discussed, the 
consolidation of democracy requires that democratic norms are deeply instilled into the structure 
of the government, so the promotion of social consent in governance is a positive sign that a 
country is developing.   
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 Poland is a prime example of how civil society can promote democratization and of how 
civil society groups can take on an element of self-defense from the state.  Unlike many other 
states investigated, Poland was able to maintain underground civil society groups that allowed 
them to democratize and consolidate faster and more reliably than states who did not have 
underground groups. The first example of dissident resistance strategy against the oppression of 
the Soviet state was the rise of the Worker’s Defense Party (KOR), later known as the larger 
Solidarity movement, in response to the crushing of the workers’ strikes in June of 1976 
(Bernhard 1993, 314).  KOR developed themselves outside the Communist party structure and 
even created a samizdat (underground) press to circulate news (Bernhard 1993, 315).  Quickly 
the organization began to splinter and grow, creating sub-movements that took on unique roles. 
The government made no formal recognition of the existence of the movement, but their 
unwillingness or inability to prevent their growth allowed them to carve out their own place in 
society (Bernhard 1993, 315). Even when martial law was declared in 1981 and legal recognition 
of groups was revoked, the movement was able to organize a movement in self-defense. 
Eventually, the Solidarity movement capitalized on the government openness propagated by 
Mikhail Gorbachev brought them to the bargaining table with the state.  The state recognized 
Solidarity, along with a few similar movements, and allowed them to run partially free elections 
(Bernhard 1993, 316).  Over time, a labor movement was able to gain national popular support, 
evade government destruction, and bring the state to the bargaining table through popular 
support.  Certainly, the Solidarity movement is a prime example of how civil groups can check 
government power and prevent corruption.   
The Catholic church was also a prominent institution that upheld civil society during 
Soviet occupation. A country as deeply entrenched in the Catholic faith would not easily accept 
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the atheistic values of Communist regimes. In fact, the Communist party made negotiations with 
the Catholic church. As a result, in 1950, the government agreed to allow religious education and 
pledged to not interfere with the church press (Linz and Stepan 1996, 256).  Even after 
crackdowns later in the decade, the party never put the Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski on trial, 
despite detaining him on house arrest. The bargaining that occurred between the state and the 
Catholic Church was a sign of the power the Church held in the region.  The cooperation 
between the church and the atheistic state seriously threatened the “ideological hegemony” 
typically exerted in Communist regimes and demonstrated the respect and fear the party had for 
the Church’s influence (Linz and Stepan 1996, 256). The Church in this context was a prime 
example of how civil society groups can hold the government accountable and wield a 
significant amount of power and influence over the state.   
Poland was a unique case because it was the only state that maintained underground civil 
society groups. This ability is likely due to Poland’s long-term experience with democratic 
institutions.  Solidarity’s negotiation with the Party State is an example of how the development 
of civil society often goes hand-in-hand with the development of political society. For parties to 
represent communal interests within the democratic structure, preliminary groups must first 
come together to share those interests.   
The polity score of Poland over time in Figure 1 supports the argument that a pre-
existing civil society promotes a prompt and long-lasting democratic government.  The small 
drop and steep rise occur in the early 1990’s. In comparison to the graphs of countries such at 
Latvia and Estonia, this climb towards democracy is much steeper, though they ultimately end at 
similar levels of democratization. Underground civil society groups were critical in Poland’s 
ability to rapidly democratize.    
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 The second arena is a “relatively autonomous and valued political society” (Linz and 
Stepan 1996, 10).  The political society arena entails the creation and appreciation of democratic 
norms, which can include political parties, election processes, and a range of electoral rules.  The 
general public must regard these rules and norms as the standard and come to regularly expect 
them. The previously explained example of the Solidarity movement in Poland is a prime 
example of how a lively civil society can create a healthy political society. What should be 
addressed is that, for many of the former Satellite States, development of parties was not that 
simple. In fact, Poland is the only country in this study that was able to maintain underground 
parties that were able to defend themselves against state power. For many states, year of one-
party rule and violent crackdowns on civil life had eliminated any prospects for the development 
of political parties. Years of single party rule had enormous effects on the development of 
political society which would take time and hard work to rebuild.  
 Nine former Soviet countries have failed to host even one free, fair election that did not 
draw the attention of regional and international electoral watchdog organizations: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan (Bader 2011, 49).  The Organizations for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) is the regional regulatory agency for electoral monitoring.  Undemocratic OSCE states 
are required to invite in observer missions during elections, and nearly all the countries have 
been visited by at least one OSCE Observer Mission (Bader 2011, 50). The electoral monitoring 
of these elections is still lacking, though.  The OSCE has deemed countries such as Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan as too lacking in the ability to conduct a free and fair election that they 
discontinued observer missions there at all (Bader 2012, 51).  In the 2008 election, Russia 
blatantly ignored he requirements for an observer mission to occur.  From what has been 
23 
 
 
observed by the OSCE missions, it is abundantly clear that electoral fraud at all levels are present 
in these nine countries alone. Many instances of fraud were present in voting and counting 
procedures, but the corruption in voting goes much deeper still.  Manipulation of the drafting of 
legislation, candidate registration, boundary drawing, election commission makeup, media 
reporting, and the way that complaints are handled (Bader 51, 2012).  Manipulation has led to a 
breakdown of electoral institutions, which allows the party to carry on in a corrupt manner and 
further their ability to stay in power longer.   
 In an article from 1987, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev’s logic behind the processes 
of Glasnost and Perestroika are revealed, illuminating the chaos that occurred as the Soviet union 
began to weaken its grip and open economic and political society In an attempt to save the 
failing Soviet Union, Gorbachev made an appeal utilizing the Leninist principles of “openness, 
public control, criticism and self-criticism” (Gidadhubli 1987, 789).  Recognizing the party state 
had strayed far from these principles, he employed them as a last-ditch effort to save the failing 
Union.  Such reforms included “the election of heads of industrial enterprises, agricultural farms, 
and workshops…by the working people themselves” (Gidadhubli 1987, 789).  The article 
proceeds to state that “there is a possibility for chaos and confusion when these policies are 
implemented in practice” (Gidadhubli 1987, 789). Indeed, the process was chaotic. For years, the 
Soviet Union had sought to destroy every aspect of civil and political life. A sufficient political 
culture to support complex electoral processes simply did not exist in many areas of the Soviet 
Union. This issue hearkens back to the concept of the simultaneity problem, where former Soviet 
States struggled to democratize after the fall of the Soviet Union because they were given two 
momentous tasks complete simultaneously.   
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The next arena is rule of law.  Put simply, the rule of law requires that all people- 
especially government and elites- follow the rules and laws set in place for all. In consolidated 
democracies the rule of law is “embodied in a spirit of Constitutionalism” that can only be 
changed by an “exceptional majority” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 11). The spirit of 
Constitutionalism is upheld by clear hierarchies of law, a judicial system to fairly interpret the 
laws, and a legal culture supported by civil society.  Essentially, the rules are laid out in a 
straightforward manner and followed consistently.  
The rule of law is of concern for natural resource rich countries because they are 
particularly susceptible to patronage, corruption, bribery, and nepotism (Franke et al. 2009, 112). 
In Azerbaijan, one of the lowest ranked countries in the world by Transparency International, 
corruption is rampant in almost every aspect of governance (Franke et al. 2009, 121).  Deeply 
entrenched Soviet habits have made the government patrimonial, ruled by informal connections 
between elites; despite anti-corruption rhetoric, little has been done to improve transparency 
(Franke et al 121). Widespread corruption has led to delays in banking development, delays in 
economic reform legislation, and regional economic imbalances (Franke et al. 2009, 121).  
Corruption and lack of rule of law can result in the stagnation of many different aspects of 
governance and limits a country’s ability to develop both economically and democratically. For 
this reason, rule of law is a crucial factor in the development of the other four arenas.  As 
previously stated, freedom of speech and of association is a crucial predecessor to a healthy civil 
society.  These rights are created, interpreted, and properly maintained by a government with 
rule of law, which is a prime example of how the arenas tend to overlap and develop in tandem.  
This is particularly true of civil society, political society, and rule of law, but that does not mean 
that the other two areas are less important to consolidation and lasting democracy.    
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The fourth factor is state bureaucracy. In order to have appropriate rule of law, corrupt 
elites must be displaced from their bureaucratic positions.  The state bureaucracy of a 
consolidated democracy is transparent, effective, and responsive.  The Soviet bureaucratic 
structure did not embody any of these features, so it was critical for former satellite states to 
“clean house” and remove any vestiges of the old regime before moving forward to an age of 
growth and prosperity.  Samuel Huntington best addresses the question of where to place 
government bureaucrats that remain loyal to the old regime in his book, The Third Wave. He 
refers to these bureaucrats as “standpatters;” standpatters “have a common interest in weakening 
the democratic groups in the center and in polarizing politics in the society” (Huntington 1991, 
122).  It is critical for democratizers to isolate and weaken the standpatters and retain your hold 
on the government and “political machinery” (Huntington 1991, 162).   
Many Soviet bureaucrats directly benefitted from the system; thus, it is rational that they 
have an interest in perpetuating the current system and hindering democratic processes.  Due to 
the nature of the regime, elites with political power had implied economic power. Elites who had 
any power over economic decisions were able to either directly or indirectly set their own 
salaries (Sherman 1994, 11). The Soviet bureaucracy was a highly hierarchical structure that 
operated on appointments, though sham elections were occasionally held (Sherman 1994, 11). It 
has been demonstrated that soft transition can result in many of the “modernized and reformed” 
communist elites retaining their positions; this oversight has led to a number of negative effects, 
such as rent-seeking and monopolies (Berend and Bugaric 2015, 778). Soviet-era bureaucrats 
were vestiges of the corruption and nepotism that took place and it was necessary to remove 
these vestiges to properly consolidate.   
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The last factor is an institutionalized economic society. This does not simply mean that 
there must be set rules and institutions for economic affairs. In this context, an institutionalized 
economic society means that there is an advanced economic system that is given at least some 
autonomy. Consolidated democracies operate almost exclusively on mixed economies that fall 
somewhere between the two extremes of a command economy and an open economy. 
The transition from a centrally planned economy to a mixed economy was a particularly 
perilous transition when coupled with the sudden social and political changes occurring at the 
same time.  Between 1928 and 1989 the political and economic aspects of the Soviet Union were 
inseparable; production decisions occurred exclusively in Moscow.  During this time, the Soviet 
economy strongly resembled a feudal model where nobles inherently had both economic and 
political power.  Essentially, the government controlled production and the elites controlled the 
government (Sherman 1994, 7).  It is easy to understand, then, why it would be easy to retain 
elements of elite power and control of resources that is seen in former Soviet Satellite states.  
Former Soviet states were severely disadvantaged in both their democratic and economic 
development due to a simultaneity problem. Evidence is beginning to surface that development 
of economic society occurs best within strong states (Linz and Stepan 1996, 436). The 
simultaneity problem explains the hardships experiences by these states as they developed an 
economic society alongside their political society.  The countries lacked the necessary rule of 
law and regulatory quality to develop the proper economic society (Linz and Stepan 1996, 435).  
The states lacked the time and, often, the capacity to properly execute “Washington Consensus” 
economic programs.  This would explain why, decades later, “only about one-tenth of the 
population of the region lives in a successfully transformed economic society” (Berend and 
Bugaric 2015, 771).  Situations have drastically improved, but the wage levels, economic 
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inequality, and reliance on Western Europe still plague the region as a whole (Berend and 
Bugaric 2015, 780).   
Kazakhstan Case Study  
 Kazakhstan is an excellent example of a post-Soviet rentier state to examine. Ethnic 
conflict, oil rents, and leftover Soviet ideals and leadership have created a complex environment 
for democratic development.  In order to systematically study the effects of Soviet rule on oil-
rich Caucasus and Caspian-region states, the seven features of post-Soviet rentier states will be 
applied to the case of Kazakhstan.  Kazakhstan exhibits several features that are uniform across 
the other post-Soviet rentier states: hyper-presidentialism, ethnic conflict, and non-transparent 
political practices, among others.   
 Kazakhs were deemed the most “Sovetized” of all Soviet citizens by the 1970’s 
(Beachain and Kevlihan 2011, 3).   The republic produced approximately a dozen Communist 
First Secretaries (Beachain and Kevlihan 2011, 3). Conversely, the region was also home to 
multiple gulags, Soviet forced labor camps, and was often used as a “dumping ground” for 
dissidents and entire populations of people who had fallen out of Soviet favor (Beachain and 
Kevlihan 2011, 2).    
 The Soviet legacy has badly damaged many of Kazakhstan’s critical institutions and 
stunted its democratic development, though.  Kazakhstan’s ethnic conflicts can, at least in part, 
be ascribed to Soviet interference in ethnic relations.  Two specific Soviet habits fueled the 
ethnic confusion. The first was the policy of moving ethnic groups around to create a more even 
ethnic mix in each of the republics.  The forced migrations were ordered to create bonds based 
on socialist beliefs and values, not ethnic background.  The ultimate goal was to create a “unified 
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populace bound together by shared beliefs and values, working together to achieve common 
social, economic, and political objectives (Beachain and Kevlihan 2011, 3). The second was the 
Soviet Union’s habits of “dumping” ethnic groups in Kazakhstan. In the 1940’s hundreds of 
thousands of Koreans, Crimean Tatars, and Germans were forced to relocate to Kazakhstan. 
Between 1954 and 196, Nikita Khrushchev ordered two million people, mostly Russians, to help 
settle uninhabited lands by relocating to them and developing them.  The objective of the plan 
backfired on party leaders.  After Kazakhstan was flooded with nearly 2 million Russians, only 
30% of the population were ethnic Kazakhs (BBC Country Profile). 
 As tensions and dissent rose within the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan saw the placement of 
Gennadiy Kolbin, who was ethnically Russian, as the Head of the Communist Party of 
Kazakhstan (CPK) (BBC Profile 2019).  Kolbin was handpicked for the position by the leader of 
the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, and replaced Dinmykhamed Kunayev, who was a Kazakh. 
Naturally, this did not go over well with many Kazakhs.  In 1986, around 3,000 people took part 
in protests regarding the appointment (BBC Profile 2019).  In 1989, Kolbin was replaced by 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, who was an ethnic Kazakh (BBC Profile 2019).  Nazarbayev was later 
elected by the Supreme Soviet as the first president and state sovereignty was declared (BCC 
Profile 2019). In 1991, the CPK withdrew from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and 
later declares independence (BBC Profile 2019). In 1993, a new constitution with increased 
presidential powers was ratified (BBC Profile 2019). Despite the rhetoric of reform that is 
regularly bandied around by both NGOs and the government, little action has ever been taken to 
address the corruption.   
 In relative terms, Kazakhstan is a prosperous country. They have enjoyed policy 
continuity and a fairly stable economy.  Since the mid-1990’s Kazakhstan’s standard of living 
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has improved drastically. For example, it has the 10th highest adult literacy rate (Beachain and 
Kevlihan 2011, 8).  This is likely due to the education system in the country that is propped up 
by oil rents, which is used as a tool of complacency to satisfy the population.  The development 
of a civic system and democracy has been eschewed in favor of ethnonational state-building and 
the collection of oil revenues.  A prime example of democratization being excluded from 
prominent development goals is the heavily advertised “Kazakhstan 2030” development plan. 
This plan includes many features of governance: “natural security, material-wellbeing, political 
stability, consolidation of the state, foreign investment, and the development of infrastructure” 
(Beachain and Kevlihan 2011, 10). There is no mention in democratization contained in the 
document, which largely focuses on the development of the relationship between the President 
and the State (Beachain and Kevlihan 2011, 10). It is clear that, while it is likely that 
Kazakhstani elites want the country to flourish, they also want that flourishing to occur within an 
institutional framework that does not threaten their stranglehold on the most profitable industries.  
From a distance, Kazakhstan may look like a democracy, but it is truly a thinly veiled 
authoritarian regime.  The regime is stable, but not free.   
In Kazakhstan, elite power in oil and gas contracts manifests itself in a hyper-presidential 
system and notably weak legislature.  International business contacts are predominantly decided 
by the president, giving the executive unprecedented power over such a profitable industry.  In 
fact, nearly all of the post-Soviet rentier states can be described as superpresidential, a term for 
when presidents are far more powerful and less accountable to than a pure presidential regime 
(Bader 2012, 54).  Because the president has so much power, over oil and in general, presidential 
elections often breed deeply ingrained corruption to ensure that elites maintain tight control over 
oil revenue (Bader 2012, 54).  Once in office, the President and high government administrators 
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make all the decisions regarding oil and gas contracts, essentially cutting public opinion and the 
legislature out of the debate (Franke et al. 2009, 124) 
Elites in the government of Kazakhstan are often corrupt, permanent, and rent seeking.  
One does not have to look farther than former President Nazarbayev to find an example of 
permanent elites.  Nazarbayev was in power from before the fall of the Soviet Union until spring 
of 2019.  The consistency of Nazarbayev’s leadership and the continuity of his policies has given 
him a measure of legitimacy.  (Beachain and Kevlihan 2011, 10).  This legitimacy and 
consistency may initially beneficial, but has hindered growth and opportunity in the long term. 
Despite his attempts to pain himself as a moderate, Nazbaryev’s desperate attempt to cling to 
power as time passed was a signal to the legislature and the general public that creating an 
institutional method to select the executive was not a priority. Nazarbayev has also consistently 
used electoral fraud to place members as many members of his party into Parliament.  In 2004, 
he maintained control over the lower house via electoral methods that were deemed flawed by 
electoral observers (BBC Profile 2019).  The 2007 elections saw little improvement, as every 
single seat in the lower house of parliament was given to his party (BBC Country Profile 2019). 
Nazarbayev’s tactics have been a critical factor in the creation of the semi-dynastic structure 
observed in modern Kazakhstan.  
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Figure 4 
 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 demonstrate the outcome and turnout for the 2011 Kazakh 
Presidential election.  As can be observed, Nazarbayev has accumulated 96% of the votes, a 
figure that is not realistic in a multiparty system (ElectionGuide 2011). The landslide win makes 
it apparent that not only is corruption present in electoral processes, but that the government feels 
as though they do not have to hide it. Similarly, the 89% voter turnout rate is not a realistic 
turnout rate when compared to other democracies.  Landslide wins such as these are a common 
observation in the post-Soviet rentier state.  The same type of landslide win can also be observed 
in the 2007 Election for the Mazhilis, the lower house of the Kazakh legislature. Figure 4 
illustrates the outcome of the election. 88% of votes were cast for Nur Otan, the party of 
Nazarbayev (ElectionGuide 2007). Though the margin that the party won by is smaller than the 
Presidency, it was still significant enough that none of the seats changed as a result of the 
election (ElectionGuide 2007).  Electoral fraud in legislative elections furthers the hyper-
presidential system because it allows the President to fill the already-weak legislature with those 
2007 House of Representatives Elections
Nur Otan National Social Democratic Party
Democratic Party of Kazakhstan Village Social Democratic Party
Communist Party Party of Patriots
Spirutuality Party
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who are sympathetic to his goals. The patrimonial structure of politics in Kazakhstan makes this 
approach particularly effective because political power depends on the officeholder’s 
relationship with the elite in the center of the circle. Disagreeing with the party leader can, and 
often does, result in the individual’s eventual removal from office. When elites benefit so greatly 
from positions of power, the costs of losing that role is magnified, further encouraging 
conformity.  
Elites have massively enriched themselves without consequence in Kazakhstan.  A prime 
example of the rampant corruption is the “Kazakhgate” Scandal (Franke et al. 2009, 126).  In the 
scandal, James Giffen, an American businessman, funneled $80 million away from four 
prominent U.S. oil companies and into a Swiss bank account.  The money was used to bribe 
Kazakhstani officials, and even included a $1 billion stake on behalf of ExxonMobil for one of 
the largest oil fields in the country. Officials, including president Nazarbaev and the former 
Prime Minister, used the profits to buy luxury purchases for themselves, including jewelry, 
speedboats, and furs. Giffen’s investment bank was chosen to represent Kazakhstan in 
negotiations with U.S. oil companies the same year that he became a counselor to Nazarbaev, 
though any influence of the President has been hidden to prevent his implication in the bribery.  
In addition, Kazakhstan hired lawyers in the United States with the intention of downplaying 
President Nazarbaev’s role in the scandal (RFL).  Similarly, many executives in national 
companies, such as Kazakhoil and Kazakhgas, have made millions in illegal income since the 
fall of the Soviet Union (Franke et al. 2009, 126).  
Kazakhgate and similar scandals are an example of how Kazakhstani elites will enrich 
themselves via corrupt oil contacts with foreign companies, especially.  Kazakhstan’s great 
efforts to conceal the involvement of the President in the scandal as compared to the implication 
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of the government as a whole is an example of how key the president is in the continuation of 
elite power in oil and gas contracts in Kazakhstan.  Most importantly, elites never suffered any 
punishment for the scandal, further normalizing corruption and ensuring other elites that laws 
and ethical rules can be broken with impunity.   
Kazakhstani elites, especially President Nazarbayev, rely on a mixture of institutional 
power and violence to ensure that power remains in the same hands. In 2002, Galymzhan 
Zhakiyanov, a critic of President Nazarbayev, was put in jail for alleged abuse of office (BBC 
Country Profile). In 2005, Zamanbeck Nurkadilov, also an open critic of the President, was 
found shot (BBC Country Profile).  In 2006, Altynbek Sarsenbaiuly, another critic of 
Nazarbayev, was found shot alongside his driver and bodyguard (BBC).   
Instead of investing oil revenue in meaningful projects that will give long-term returns 
that assist in overall development, revenue is used to purchase support of the public so they are 
less likely to demand a long-term solution for development.  The purchase of support often takes 
the form of government social services. Kazakhstanis enjoy free primary education and 
healthcare via the government, which are made possible by significant oil and gas rents (Franke 
et al. 127).  Social services placate the public, allowing the government to carry on enriching 
themselves without the interference of citizen outrage.  While creating social safety net programs 
could be viewed as important to the development of a country, it does little to none to address the 
underlying problem of economic development.  
In part due to the to corruption, a simultaneity problem, and a late start, Kazakhstan has 
seen a lack of regulation of economic structures as compared to other modern states. Kazakhstan, 
as a part of its deep “Sovietism,” was very dependent on the centrally-planned economy. The 
sudden dissolution of that economy led to the collapse of the metallurgy mining, and wheat 
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industries that previously constituted a large part of Kazakhstan’s GDP. These industries were 
31% of annual GDP in 1996 but dropped to 21% in 1996 (Franke et al. 122).  The economy has 
taken an upturn in years since due to oil exports and foreign investment (Franke et al. 122).  
These sources, while great for development in the short term, can be unstable sources of income.  
Foreign investment is dependent on investor confidence in the strength and stability of the 
domestic economy, which could be susceptible to windfalls.  This has been less of an issue in 
Kazakhstan because it has smaller, more stable stream of oil rents as compared to countries like 
Azerbaijan that have seen a sudden burst of oil income that will inevitably end abruptly (Franke 
et al, 122).  There is still a chance, though, that Kazakhstan’s economic reliance on such an 
unpredictable industry could cause rapid rise and fall, which could affect foreign investment, the 
other critical feature of the economy.  There was a turn toward oil privatization in the mid 1990’s 
as an attempt to move towards a market economy, but many of the same government elites are 
still influential over the private companies or the contracts they must follow, ensuring that 
corrupt interests are still represented (Franke et al. 123).   
Kazakhstan has also ignored the development of aspects of the economy that would 
likely bolster economic and democratic development, according to studies of developed 
countries. Manufacturing is often a strong factor in the democratic development in developing 
countries (Huntington).  Kazakhstan has failed to capture the opportunity to manufacture the 
machinery or spare parts for its oil extraction and refining industry.  Most of the spare parts for 
the machinery come from Italy, the United States, France, or Japan (Franke et al. 128). The lack 
of development in domestic manufacturing has only exacerbated the uneven development. Like 
many developing nations at the time, Kazakhstan turned to trade protectionism to make its 
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markets more competitive. This has not strengthened the economy, though, because it has just 
created products that are lower quality at a higher price (Franke et al. 129).   
It is true that Kazakhstan has been relatively economically stable, especially over the 
course of former President Nazarbayev’s term as president. The regime was able to walk the fine 
line between giving enough to the people so that they do not rise up violently or demand rapid 
change, but unfair enough to create stirrings of discontent among civil society leaders. One 
crucial piece that is missing is a proper system of redistribution. The free healthcare and 
education have done little to assist families that are vulnerable to the inevitable economic 
windfalls that occur in oil-rich states. Kazakhstan often takes part in white-elephant projects, 
which are “populist activities that are highly powerful symbolically but economically senseless” 
(Franke et al. 2009, 130). An example is the movement of the capital city to Astana from Almaty 
or the extravagant skyscrapers.  Kazakhstan also has a very high poverty level relative to state 
income; the poverty rate is about 34%, similar to many less-developed countries in the region 
(Franke et al. 2009, 129). Investment in social welfare has the intent of consolidating power for 
the regime, not to ensure a minimum quality of life for citizens.   
Because the general public sometimes benefits from the oil revenues, they lend some 
legitimacy to the government. This is one of many reasons why the economic sector of the 
Kazakhstan government holds a moderate level of legitimacy. In addition, the Soviet legacy of 
not questioning or speaking out against the government is deeply ingrained in the population and 
the political system, which is a steep hierarchy of elites. As previously stated, Kazakhstan was 
highly “Sovietized” early in their time as a Soviet state, which has had a profound effect on 
political behavior in the country.  It is reasonable to believe that Kazakhstanis would be less 
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likely to be upset by corrupt practices or backdoor deals when that was the process that they had 
become accustomed to.   
Kazakhstan’s economy, especially in oil sectors, relies on secrecy to conduct backdoor 
deals with those who are in the elites’ inner circles. In order to continue this process, elites have 
incentives to prevent the government from being transparent.  Neither state or national budgets 
make it clear exactly how much money is being put into national oil funds (Franke et al. 2009, 
131).  The lack of transparency is allowed to occur because Kazakhstan lacks a significant 
political and civil society, two critical institutions for the development and consolidation of 
democracy, to hold the government accountable for reforms. Towards the end of an election 
term, these issues often come up in the discourse of the general public, and even within political 
parties.  By the time that the elections occur, these issues are thrown by the wayside.  NGOs 
have enjoyed some success by creating national programs to control the budget, but their power 
is lacking compared to that of a political party (Franke et al. 2019, 151).   
Hypotheses 
With a greater understanding of how formerly authoritarian countries develop and 
consolidate, how Soviet rule affected nearly every aspect of the state, and how abundant natural 
resources can hinder development, the hypotheses stated in the introduction can be restated and 
tested.  The theory behind the existence of the post-Soviet rentier state lends itself to the 
following hypotheses: (H1) As institutionalization increases, level of democracy is likely to 
increase; (H2) On average, as the availability of natural resources decreases, democracy is 
likely to increase. 
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Methods, Measures, and Data 
Table 1: Countries Included  
Countries Included in the Study 
Armenia  Azerbaijan 
Belarus Estonia 
Georgia Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan Latvia 
Lithuania Moldova 
Poland Russia 
Tajikistan Turkmenistan 
Ukraine  Uzbekistan 
U.S.S,R.  
 
Table1 demonstrates the countries that are included in this study. Data was collected from 
each country from the following years: 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1985, 1986, 
1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 
2010, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017. These dates were chosen to emphasize critical time periods.  
Scores are gathered regularly (by decade) to establish as baseline throughout the course of the 
century.  As time grows closer to the end of the Soviet Union, more years are collected to better 
analyze smaller changes during the time period studied. From 1996 to 2014, the data for every 
other year is recorded to closely track trends into modern day.  Finally, the most recent years for 
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which data has been released (2015, 2016, and 2017) are included so that the most recent 
calculation is always included.   
Polity score is utilized to measure the level of democracy.  There are two raw scores that 
factor into the final polity score- democracy and autocracy.  The 21-point scale ranges from +10, 
strongly democratic, to -10, strongly autocratic (Polity Project 2018).  The Democracy score 
reflects the extent to which democratic norms and procedures have integrated themselves in the 
system of governance in the state. Autocracy is calculated in a similar manner, of course, 
accounting for the extent to which autocratic norms and procedures are integrated into the system 
of governance (Polity Project 2018).  
Rents are measured as a percentage of overall annual GDP.  Data was gathered for each 
country’s exports of oil, natural gas, and hard rock minerals as percent of total GDP. Data was 
gathered for years between 1988 and 2017 for oil rents and 1987 (Turkmenistan and Ukraine 
only) to 2007 for natural gas rents.   
In order to assess the relationship between the gas rents and level of democratization, a 
fixed-effects regression analysis was performed. The measures used in the analysis were 
carefully chosen to ensure the specificity of the observed outcome. Polity score had the most 
robust set of available data and encompasses features of democratization in a simple, practical 
manner. It does not feature other measures of growth and development, such as health or literacy, 
that may skew the outcome. In this case, the specificity of the measure is a significant advantage 
because it better isolates democratization as a variable.  Oil rents as percent of overall GDP was 
utilized as a measure of oil rents within a country.  Participation in the UN was coded as a 1, and 
lack of participation a 0; NATO involvement was coded in the same manner.   
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A panel regression best fits the data.  It is critical to view the status of each country as it 
changes over time, but in the end we are still observing the countries at one period of time.  
When using this type of data, a challenge does present itself. In panel data, t+1 depends on the 
value of t, which means that a subsequent observation is depending on the preceding observation. 
The effect of this dependency was remedied by utilizing a fixed effect.  Essentially, each value is 
entered in as a dummy variable. The fixed-effects were chosen because it tends to create a more 
conservative estimate and better controls for time, which is critical for this data set. The data was 
clustered by country, resulting in 16 clusters.  
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Results  
Table 2: Predicting Polity Score Among Post-Soviet States Using Fixed Effects Regression  
 
# of Objects: 270
# of Groups: 16
R -squared:
Within: 0.0925
Between: 0.1931
Overall: 0.0879
Polity Coefficient Std. Err. t p>|t|
Oil Rent -0.070 0.035 -2.020 0.062 -0.144 0.004
Gas Rent 0.008 0.013 0.660 0.52 -0.019 0.036
Year
1991 5.407 1.135 4.760 0 2.988 7.826
1992 5.338 1.167 4.570 0 2.851 7.826
1993 4.739 1.100 4.310 0.001 2.396 7.083
1994 4.917 1.097 4.480 0 2.579 7.255
1995 3.699 0.393 9.420 0 2.862 4.537
1996 2.765 0.768 3.600 0.003 1.129 4.402
1998 3.469 0.431 8.050 0 2.550 4.387
2000 4.169 0.505 8.260 0 3.094 5.245
2002 4.019 0.465 8.640 0 3.027 5.011
2004 4.083 0.440 9.280 0 3.145 5.021
2006 4.697 0.469 10.010 0 3.697 5.697
2008 4.436 0.416 10.670 0 3.549 5.322
2010 4.128 0.359 11.510 0 3.363 4.893
2012 4.535 0.561 8.080 0 3.338 5.731
2014 4.465 0.581 7.680 0 3.227 5.704
2015 4.360 0.591 7.380 0 3.101 5.619
2016 4.360 0.589 7.400 0 3.104 5.615
2017 4.439 0.663 6.700 0 3.026 5.852
Constant -2.571 0.112 -23.050 0 -2.809 -2.333
Sigma u 6.540
Sigma e 2.348
rho 0.886
P-values are two-tailed. 
Standard Error is adjusted for 16 clusters in country. 
95% Confidence Int.
Fixed-Effects (Within) Regression 
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The regression analysis, Table 2, demonstrates that there is a negative, statistically 
significant relationship between higher percentages of oil rents and lower levels of 
democratization.  It is statistically significant at the .03 level.  This means that we have reason to 
believe that there is a relationship between high oil rents and low levels of democracy.  
Interestingly, there is not a statistically significant relationship between higher 
percentages of natural gas rents and lower levels of democratization.  This is likely due to the 
low number of samples in the regression analysis that exhibit particularly large amounts of 
natural gas rents.  
Implications  
Understanding the development process of a newly minted state with large stores of 
crude oil and natural gas is absolutely critical to a modern understanding of how economic 
development shapes the lives and livelihoods of citizens in developing states. As we can glean 
from the case studies, these resources are easily exploited, causing a complex pattern of 
development not seen in resource-poor states.  Many states in the world that are still developing 
also have significant natural resources. Gaining a greater understanding of the likely paths of 
development can allow state governments and the international community to identify a problem 
and address it before it becomes deeply rooted in the systems of government within that state.  
The study of the effect of resource abundance on the economic and political development 
of states can also inform policymakers of more appropriate ways to support the processes of 
democratic development within said states. In the context of former Soviet States, it has been 
made abundantly clear that aid money to the government is the incorrect way to foster long-term 
economic and democratic development. The corrupt elites will ensure that at least some of the 
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aid money will be spent on corrupt, selfish investments, as opposed to less-glamorous 
investments that will pay off in the long term.   
Nongovernmental organizations, as seen in the examples of electoral monitoring and civil 
society development, should not be underestimated as a way to counter the influence of 
authoritarianism in developing, resource-rich states.  Essentially, they can plant the seeds of 
democratic institutions at the local level that can allow the citizens of a country to slowly take 
power back into their hands over time. This is a far more sustainable approach, but it also 
requires a significant contribution up front, which could be an obstacle. As demonstrated by the 
cases in this study, democracy seldom happens quickly or by force.  Only though the steady 
development of critical institutions can a democracy be created and continue to thrive. 
Essentially, if the seed is sown, then there is no telling how it can grow and expand.   
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